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Kind of Alaska and No Man's Land, two of Harold Pinter's recent plays,

demonstrate the range between naturalistic and stylized elements in his work. l
In

~

Kind of Alaska, the situation and characters cohere in a believable if

unusual representation of reality.

No Man's Land, however, resists this

treatment as a naturalistic set of circumstances.

Although the dialogue of

both plays is composed of ordinary, spoken language, its effects resist the
label of realism; one critic has called Pinter a "hyperrealist" and "a
virtuoso of phonomimesis.,,2

(By "ordinary language" I mean language that

people use in conversational discourse as opposed to specialized types of
language.)

Through an analysis of these two plays, this essay will attempt to

uncover some of the ways in which Pinter's drama employs ordinary speech to
yield extraordinary effects.
Like most other Pinter critics, Austin Quigley identifies this puzzling
effect of Pinter's language as a central issue in his work. 3

Quigley

identifies a general trend in Pinter criticism of treating this quality as
something mysterious and almost magical:

"These [terms describing Pinter's

language] are variously described as language that transcends the expressible,
language that abandons the expressible, language that conveys things in spite
of what it expresses. ,.4

Such views suggest that Pinter's language has the

unique property of communicating one thing while meaning another.
The problem with this idea, Quigley suggests, is that it wrongly assumes
that there is a normal, core counterpart to the supposedly extraordinary way
in which Pinter uses language. S

"Normal" here refers to a supposed type of

ordinary language that occupies a place of logical priority over other types
of ordinary language.

Quigley, basing his argument on Wittgenstein's later

work, denies the notion that language has core uses and peripheral uses. 6
account of what makes Pinter's language interesting is that it is not

His
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IIprimarily referential

ll

;

rather, liThe language of a Pinter play functions

primarily as a means of dictating and reinforcing relationships.1I7

In short,

there is nothing mysterious or transcendent about Pinter's use of ordinary
language.
Closely linked to this quality of Pinter's language is the issue of
exposition.

For most dramatists, exposition is a simple matter of conveying

undisputed facts about the characters and situation, usually at an early point
in the play.

In Pinter's plays, on the other hand, exposition is never taken

for granted; primary importance is often given to veiling, unveiling, and
disputing facts about the characters.
past motivates the action in both

The search for identity through one's

a Kind

of Alaska and No Man's Land.

Consequently, the main type of action in both plays is speaking.

Against

charges that this type of dramatic strategy becomes a gimmick, Quigley writes,
In depicting the characters' efforts to complete or
renegotiate the consensus in these areas, the plays
chart the progressive development of the character
relationships, not simply the progressive revelation
of them. 8
Again, the use of language as a tool of negotiation as well as an index
of relationships helps to yield this effect.

But just how this function of

language leads to extraordinary or dislocating effects is not clear from
Quigley's analysis.

In contrast to his work, then, this essay will use the

view that speech is a form of contextual action (speech acts) as a tool for
analyzing Pinter's language.

This approach will offer a more rigorous and

satisfying account of just what traditional critics find mystifying about
Pinter's language.
My purpose, however, lies not only in a desire to contribute insight to

-3the critical canon on Pinter.

I also wish to offer some insight into the

literary application of speech act theory.

Among the writers I will discuss

are Austin, Searle, Altieri, Pratt, Derrida, and Fish.

This application leads

to my belief that drama is the literary genre to which speech act theory is
most appropriate and applicable (in much the same way as the poem serves as
the New Critical model).

I will begin with a brief introduction to speech act

theory, move on to my analysis of the plays, make general inferences about the
plays and the theory, and then reach for conclusions.

Speech act theory originated with J.L. Austin's How To Do Things With
Words. 9

He begins by classifying "performatives, " statements for which "the

issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action. ,,10
performatives to "constatives," which merely assert.

He opposes

For example, he writes,

"To name the ship is to say (in the appropriate circumstances) the words 'I
name, &c' .,,11

Contained within each performative, he claims, are three

distinct actions:

the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts:

We perform a locutionary act, which is roughly equivalent
to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and
reference ... Second, we said that we also perform
illocutionary acts such as informing, ordering, warning,
undertaking, &c., i.e. utterances which have a certain
(conventional) force. Thirdly, we may also perform
perlocutionary acts: what we bring about or achieve
hy saying something ... 12
According to Austin, performative utterances are neither true nor false;
rather, they are successful or infelicitous. 13
actions or they don't.

Either they work as completed

Central to the analysis of speech acts is the idea of

context:
Once we realize that what we have to study is not the
sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech
situation, there can hardly be any longer a possibility
of not seeing that stating is performing an act. 14

-4The implication of this point, in addition to emphasis on context, is that
Austin is extending his category of performative (i.e., actions like naming a
boat) to include all utterances.

Austin himself later denies this, still

clinging to an admittedly tenuous distinction between performatives and
constatives (mere statements of fact).15
John Searle, Austin's closest student and follower, makes some important
contributions to this view of language in his Speech Acts. 16

First, he denies

the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary actions (SA,

p. 23 n.).

Second, he denies Austin's belief that certain types of speech acts are
logically connected to certain words.
and it takes this form:
p. 137).

He calls this the speech act fallacy,

"'The word R is used to perform speech act

He finds an example of this fallacy in Austin's analysis:

word 'know' is used to give guarantees. 1,,17

a'"
!I

(SA,

'The

The point is not that "know"

doesn't give guarantees, but that it doesn't always serve that purpose and
that guarantees can be made without it (SA, p. 137-138).
Searle incorporates Austin's insights into a more systematic and rigorous
philosophy of language.

According to him, a given utterance can contain an

utterance act, a propositional act, an illocutionary act, and a perlocutionary
act (SA, p 24-25).

He further subdivides the category of illocutionary act

into the following categories:

requesting, asserting, questioning, thanking,

advising, warning, greeting, and congratulating (SA, p 66-67).,,18

In my

analysis of the plays, I will use primarily Searle's version of speech act
theory.

Later I will modify and expand Searle's analysis in order to provide

a more complete picture of literary speech acts in drama.

Illocutionary speech acts, primarily of asserting and questioning, are

-5the central events in
Other Places.

A Kind

of Alaska, the longest play from the collection

The action begins when Deborah wakes up from almost thirty

years of a waking coma caused by sleeping sickness.

For Deborah, her sister

Pauline, and Hornby (her doctor, recently married to Pauline), speech is
critical to these first few moments of consciousness.

When Deborah first

speaks, Hornby asks, "Can you hear me?" and she answers, "Are you speaking?"
(AKA, p 5-6).

The illocutionary force of these questions is clear (probing,

information-seeking), but they are meant to test for a response rather than to
find a yes or no answer.

Deborah's reply then, is both an affirmative answer

to Hornby's question and a request for a similar response (SA, 38).

She

refers to Hornby ("you") apparently in order to determine whether he is really
there.

Her difficulty results from her uncertainty about how to make a fully

appropriate response to Hornby's question, and whether what she perceives is
actually happening.
The main interest of the play lies in careful speaking and listening;
Deborah's goal is to discern and integrate the facts of her situation, and
Pauline and Hornby try to assist her in this process.
at stake, then, in everything the characters say.

There is a great deal

Deborah often ignores or

refuses to believe what Hornby and Pauline tell her; they, on the other hand,
avoid saying anything that they think may shock her.
For much of the play the characters talk past each other.
denials, Deborah suspects Hornby of raping her:
me?" (AKA, p. 12).

Despite his

"Have you had your way with

She pretends to disbelieve Hornby's denial and goes on to

assert that he has done so.

The uncetainty of her next comment, though,

suggests that the force of her statement was information-seeking, as if it
were a question:

"I sound childish.

Out of ... tune" (AKA, p. 12).19

a case in which exposition becomes central to the drama:

This is

the audience's

-6uncertainty about whether she has been raped parallels Deborah's; it only
becomes clear that he has not raped her after weighing her apparent
unreliability in comparison with Hornby in the context of the whole play.
She also denies that Pauline is her sister and that she herself is a
Her voice varies between that of a child, an adolescent, and a

grown woman.
confused adult.
Daddy today.

Sometimes she catalogues what she remembers:

He's funny.

balloons" (AKA, p. 8).

He makes me laugh.

"I've not seen

He runs with me.

We play with

At the end she tries to report what she's been told

with dismay:
You say I have been asleep. You say I am now awake. You
say I have not awoken from the dead. You say I was not
dreaming then and am not dreaming now. You say I have
always been alive and am alive now. You say I am a woman.
(AKA, p. 40)
This speech is an assertion about the content of Hornby's assertions; taken
literally, it appears to be a successful assimilation of what Deborah has been
told.

But her emphatic repetition of "you say" suggests an element of

disbelief.

The speech that follows reveals a failure to integrate all of what

she has been told; the voice of the woman contains the voice of the girl:
She doesn't go to her ballet classes any more. Mummy and
Daddy and Estelle are on a world cruise. They've stopped
off in Bangkok. It'll be my birthday soon. I think I have
the matter in proportion. (AKA, p. 40)
In

a Kind

of Alaska, dramatic tension lies in the success or failure of the

characters in communicating with each other.

Along with this runs the

question of whether what the characters say is true.

Pauline tells Deborah

that her family is on a cruise, but later Hornby tells her that her father is
blind and her mother is dead.
In Speech Acts, Searle outlines the following conditions for an
illocutionary speech act to be meaningful, or successful:

-7utters sentence T and means it (i.e., means literally
what he says)=
~ utters T and
(~) ~ intends (i-I) the utterance ~ of T to produce
in H the knowledge (recognition, awareness) that the
states of affairs specified by (certain of) the rules
of T obtain. (Call this effect the illocutionary
effect, IE)
(k) ~ intends ~ to produce IE by means of the recognition of

~

i-I.
(£) ~

intends that i-I will be recognized in virtue of (by
means of) H's knowledge of (certain of) the rules
governing (the elements of) T.
(SA, pp. 49-50)

This analysis shows that the mere utterance of a single sentence requires the
successful satisfaction of complicated conditions.
(~)

In this play, conditions

(£) are most often called into question.

Hornby and Pauline find it difficult to achieve the illocutionary effect
in Deborah, because she either can't or doesn't want to accept the rules
required by conditions

(~)

and (£).

They may utter sentences successfully,

but the fact that Deborah is older than she feels may prevent her from
understanding.

For a woman whose most recent waking memories are thirty years

old, simple acts of communicating are no trivial matter.

Because of this

bizarre condition, the "rules" of each statement T in the above analysis are
called into question.

For example, they can't decide whether to lie or tell

her the truth:
Pauline: Shall I tell her lies or the truth?
Hornby: Both. (AKA, p. 27)
This problem, along with Deborah's inability to understand and manipulate the
rules of meaning, makes

~

Kind of Alaska a play in which exposition occupies a

central place in characterizing and dramatizing the relationships of the
characters.
Deborah's problem of communication, on the other hand, stems from
forgetting the rules of speech, her failure to understand her current

-8condition, confusing children's and adults' speech patterns, and a dim
understanding of her unconscious experience.

Her speech is muddled because

she has a poor grasp of the rules that govern speaking as well the experiences
about which she speaks.

Consequently, she uses poetic or non-literal imagery

to describe her experience variously as the sea, the desert, prison, a "vast
series of halls" in which "glass reflects glass" and dancing "in narrow
spaces" (AKA, pp. 13, 14, 17, 25, 39).
Interestingly, the two main physical actions performed by Deborah are
accompanied by long, poetic speeches that refer to her unconscious state.
First, she illustrates her sensation of dancing "in narrow spaces" by getting
up and demonstrating the dance.

Second, toward the end of the play, she

experiences what threatens to be a relapse into her former condition:
She begins to flick her cheek [ .... J They're closing
the walls in. Yes [ .... J During the course of this
speech her body becomes hunchbacked.
Let me out. Stop it [ .... J They're closing my face.
Chains and padlocks. (AKA, p. 38)
The combination of metaphorical ("the walls") and colloquial (the ambiguous
"They're") elements in her language yield the mixed effect of naturalistic and
literary language that is characteristic of Pinter.
For Deborah, the outlook for successful communication seems paradoxically
more optimistic than for the other two.
intuitively lucid and communicative.

Her dialogue has the effect of being

To accommodate this to the speech act

model, the rules governing her utterances could be changed to allow for
metaphorical language.

That is, we could rewrite the rules for a successful

speech act on non-literal or metaphorical terms; this would be problematic,
since non-literal language relies on complex and inherently ambiguous rulegoverned conventions such as metaphor.

-9In his essay on metaphor, Searle expresses this point, namely, that in
order for metaphorical utterances to be uttered and understood, there must be
"shared strategies" and "shared principles" between the speaker and listener:
The question, 'How do metaphors work?' is a bit like
the question, 'How does one thing remind us of another
thing?' There is no single answer to this question,
0
though similarity plays a major role in answering both 2
Searle offers a set of principles that account for how metaphors work; they
are summarized in his seventh principle:
The hearer's task is not to go from 'li is £' to li is R'
but to go from 'li £-relation~' to 'li R-relation ~'
and the latter task is formally rather different from
the former because, for example, our similarity principles
in the former case will enable him to find a property that
li and £ things have in common, namely, R.21
Conventions like metaphor, then, are governed by their own sets of rules.
The appeal they hold for literary works like
things:

a Kind

of Alaska relates to two

first, the metaphors provide Deborah with an avenue for expressing

her unprecedented experiences--they allow her to describe what has never been
described; second, the relational process of interpreting these metaphors is
different from and more complicated than interpreting ordinary referring
expressions.

Differences as well as similarities between the terms enrich

this interpretive experience.

At the risk of painting in very broad strokes,

I would say that this type of process yields much of what is aesthetically
satisfying in this playas well as in all other literature.

a Kind

of Alaska is primarily about the difficulty in meeting the

requirements for a successful speech act of assertion or questioning.
Although the end of the play is optimistic about Deborah's recovery, it is
clear from her words that Pauline's and Hornby's speech acts have often failed
in creating uptake, or the illocutionary effect, in Deborah.

The most

compelling moments in the play involve such lapses of communication.

For

-10instance, after Deborah denies Pauline's claim that she is a widow by saying
she is mad, Hornby steps in and again tries to tell her what has happened,
slipping into metaphorical language:
Your mind has not been damaged. It was merely suspended, it
took up a temporary habitation ... in a kind of Alaska [ .... J
Your ventured into quite remote ... utterly foreign ...
territories. You kept on the move. And I charted your
itinerary. (AKA, p. 35)
This passage comes from the longest speech whose purpose it is to inform
Pauline of what has happened.

Her response neither confirms nor denies the

uptake of these speech acts of assertion:

"I want to go home [ .... J Is it my

birthday soon?" (AKA, p. 35).
As I mentioned before, this play lies quite securely in the category of
naturalism; the characters and events are credible imitations of ordinary
reality.

Yet the play has profoundly non-naturalistic, stylized effects.

Among the most obvious of these is the sense that the non-literal or poetic
language communicates more successfully than the literal language.
reasons for this are understandable.

The

First, there is no precedent for

Deborah's condition, so there is no vocabulary with which to describe it; thus
Hornby's quite apt phrase that Deborah's mind has been "in a kind of Alaska."
Second, Hornby and Pauline want to avoid shocking Deborah, so they often
resort to euphemisms and lies (e.g., Pauline's claim that the family is on a
"world cruise" [AKA, p. 28]).

Pinter's paradoxical success in this play is

that he chooses a naturalistic medium to discuss problems of communication and
the communicative triumph of literary over literal language.

Although No Man's Land is vastly more stylized and self-consciously
literary than

A Kind

of Alaska, the two plays share the same basic concerns.

-11-

First, both plays are primarily about speech acts; in the latter, speech
serves to navigate an extremely delicate situation, while in No Man's Land
language becomes a sophisticasted tool of power in the hands of literati
(Spooner and Hirst) and a crude weapon for lower-class thugs (Foster and
Briggs).
Second, sexual and linguistic elements are linked as metaphors for power
in both plays.

In

~

Kind of Alaska, Deborah shifts from an awareness that

Hornby is speaking to a suspicion that he has "had your way with me" (AKA, p.
12).

Control of speech suggests a position of advantage, and that, in turn,

suggests a sexual advantage.

Conversely, this accusation puts Hornby in a

defensive position and gives her temporary control of the situation.

As my

analysis shows, the effectiveness of this metaphor (which is made by Pinter
rather than the character) derives from the process of interpretation.

The

audience must infer either that the character has been raped or that her
experience of Hornby bears some relation to the experience of rape.

Further,

the fact that Pauline and Hornby are married suggests the element of the love
triangle that is so prominent in Betrayal, Old Times, The Basement, and Tea
Party.22

In No Man's Land, sexual and linguistic finesse become

interchangeable in the power struggle between Spooner and the other three.
Third, figures of speech, colloquial sayings, and literary allusions
receive special attention in both plays.

As speech acts, colloquialisms

suggest familiarity and informality; for Deborah they often signify a coy,
girlish stance:

"Was I bold as brass?", "ginger boy," and "flibbertigibbet."

At other times she uses elaborate language that expresses precocity and
superiority, over Pauline, for example:
And she's only ... thirteen. I keep telling her I'm not
prepared to tolerate her risible, her tendentious, her
eclectic, her ornate, her rococo insinuations and

-12garbled inventions.

(AKA, p. 21)

Spooner makes his mastery of and admiration for ornate language explicit:
metaphor.

Things are looking up" (NML, p. 94).

"A

For him and Hirst these uses

of language become rhetorical weapons in an oblique struggle for control over
each other.
Finally, both plays contain soliloquies in which unconscious states
(dreams, sleeping sickness) suggesting a state of permanence are described.
In both cases, these states seem indeterminate and evade precise description;
it is as if language is inadequate to communicate this type of experience
directly.

Metaphorical descriptions approximate the experience by relating it

to something more familiar.

Interestingly, in both plays this experience

relates to a state of coldness as well as permanence. 23

Both plays are in a

sense about performing speech acts, partly because these permanent states are
difficult to describe.

This emphasis on permanence also contributes to what

distinguishes Pinter's dialogue from the ordinary speech after which it is
modelled.

This topic, insofar as it is characteristically literary, is

indicated by what Charles Altieri calls "illocutionary operators which invoke
methods of projection"; that is, it is one of the signals that this discourse
is literary.24

This projection in turn helps signal the literariness of the

text on Altieri's institutional and procedural definition of literature. 25

No Man's Land presents a complicated picture of friendship, cruelty, role
reversal, memory, and permanence.

Like Davies in The Caretaker, Spooner is

the outsider who tries to win the favor of his host and contemporary, Hirst. 26
His only weapon in this struggle is the power of speech, and he successfully
dominates the conversation with Hirst in the first half of Act I.

When Foster

and Briggs enter, however, Spooner immediately loses this advantage.

The two

-13younger men shower verbal abuse on him in a way that recalls the menace of
Pinter's earlier plays (especially Goldberg and McCann in The Birthday
Party).27

In the second act, Hirst and Spooner exchange a stunning shower of

verbal blows based on their respective versions of past love affairs.

Hirst

effects a kind of role reversal with Spooner in Act II (reminiscent of The
Basement and Tea Party) by gaining the verbal upper hand and eventually
reducing him to a poor man pleading for employment.

The play concludes after

Hirst and his lackeys clearly shut out Spooner by ignoring his offers of help,
which are actually pathetic pleas.
The play's opening indicates its two dominant forms of action:
and drinking.

talking

After preparing drinks, finishing them, and going for seconds,

Spooner resumes a conversation they began on the way back from the pub where
they met:
There are some people who appear to be strong, whose idea of
what strength consists of is persuasive, but who inhabit
the idea and not the fact. What they possess is not
strength but expertise [ .... J It takes a man of intelligence
and perception to stick a needle through that posture and
discern the essential flabbiness of the stance. I am
such a man. (NML, p. 78)
For Spooner, strength lies in control of language.

The distinction Spooner

makes here may be described as one between actions and words, but the fact
that his main actions in the play are speech acts (primarily assertions)
undercuts this distinction.

Indeed, the speech from which this is taken is

composed of assertive illocutionary speech acts that are rhetorical in nature
(i.e., they are intended to produce the perlocutionary effect of trust and
good will toward him).
Language becomes a subject of conversation with a witticism made about
Spooner:

"A wit once entitled me a betwixt twig peeper.

A most clumsy

-14construction, I thought" (NML, p. 80).

This assertion, which is followed by a

second assertion about the manner of the first, has a double effect:

it draws

attention to the subject of language style while avoiding the implications of
his "peeping."

In response to Hirst's terse "What a wit," he goes on to

maintain, "All we have left is the English language.
(NML, p. 80).

Can it be salvaged?"

Hirst's reply is that its salvation rests in Spooner, to which

Spooner condescendingly responds, "It's uncommonly kind of you to say so.

In

you too, perhaps, although I haven't sufficient evidence to go on, as yet"
(NML, p. 81).
By performing such evaluative, assertive speech acts about Hirst (who is
a poet) and language, Spooner begins to gain an advantage over him.

The above

reply also illustrates his frequent use of sarcasm (the multiple references to
"kindness," which Steven Gale suggests allude to

a Streetcar

that has the effect of being patronizing and belittling.
uses of "kindness" become a blatantly unkind gesture.

Named Desire 28 )

These overstated

As Spooner gains an

advantage, though, he gradually makes his motivations clear (as in the
"boatman" speech) and consequently makes himself vulnerable to the rejection
and cruelty he faces later.
Spooner and Hirst make numerous literary allusions to Eliot, Tennessee
Williams, and Shakespeare which Gale refers to as "substitutes for content. ,,29
In other words, he interprets them as sketchy, unfinished ideas on the part of
Pinter, implying that a better play would suppress these allusions and offer
original formulations of "no man's land."

This view, however, overlooks the

fact that the characters using the allusions are literati; the allusions are
flat and pedantic only because the characters who use them are as well.
The important sexual motif of the play surfaces as Spooner denies that
his peeping is voyeurism:

"I don't peep on sex.

That's gone forever" (NML,

-15p. 81).

Sex, for Spooner, is characterized by transience as well as power,

and he claims to shun it in favor of the more permanent realm of linguistic
art.

Explaining that "Experience is a paltry thing," he maintains, "I myself

can do any graph of experience you wish [ .... J I am a poet.
in where I am eternally present and active" (NML, p. 82).

I am interested
This disregard for

historical fact provides a clue in the search to understand Spooner's
confusing remarks.

Many of his speech acts appear to be assertions, but they

are often deceitful, rhetorical devices. 30
In keeping with this quest for permanence, Spooner (despite his denials
in the first act) seeks to join Hirst's "No man's land" which "does not
move ... or change ... or grow old" (NML, p. 96).

After Spooner tells Hirst how

he met a Hungarian who impressed him because "he possessed a measure of
serenity the like of which I had never encountered," he continues, "And I met
you at the same pub tonight" (NML, p. 87).

Everything Spooner says to Hirst

is intended to persuade him of his merit and potential value as a personal
secretary.

He realizes that there is something unchanging about Hirst and

embarks on a campaign to control him through parasitism.
a verbal battleground for a metaphysical prize:
defences [ ... J call up the cavalry" (NML, p. 82).

It is a war waged on

"I could advance, reserve my
Whether this permanence is

worthwhile is questionable, and this uncertainty makes the struggle a balanced
one.

While Spooner seeks the comfort of Hirst's unchanging environment, Hirst

envies Spooner's freedom:

"It's a long time since we had a free man in this

house" (NML, p. 83).
For Spooner and the other characters, there is little differentiation
between past and present, fantasy and fact.

His belated self-introduction in

the middle of Act I, although told in the present tense, clearly represents a

-16combination of nostagia and lyrical romance:
Young poets come to me. They read me their verses [ .... J
But with the windows open to the garden, my wife pouring
long glasses of squash, with ice, on a summer evening,
young voices occasionally lifted in unaccompanied ballad
[ •.. J what can ail? I mean who can gainsay us? What
quarrel can be found with what is, £g fond, a gesture
towards the sustenance and preservation of art, through art
to virtue? (NML, p. 90)
By recalling the "bucolic life" of the aristocratic literati and making
numerous sexual slanders, Spooner gains influence over Hirst (NML, p. 91).
Spooner's intuitive sensitivity to Hirst's weaknesses, rather than adherence
to historical truth, is the mechanism whereby he exercises this power.
When Spooner's recollection of the gilded past strikes a chord in Hirst,
he immediately seizes this advantage by making a barrage of obscene
insinuations in cricket jargon about his wife ("did she google?" (NML, p.
92».31

When Hirst fails to answer, Spooner says,

I begin to wonder whether truly accurate and therefore
essentially poetic definition means anything to you
at all. I begin to wonder whether you truly did love
her [ ... J I have seriously questioned these propositions
and find them threadbare. (NML, p. 93)
The equation of "accurate" and "essentially poetic" speech explains Spooner's
indifference to the historical past and his complete dedication to literary
language.

Finally, Hirst throws his glass and expresses his despair:

"Tonight ... my friend ... you find me in the last lap of a race ... I had long
forgotten to run" (NML, p. 94).

Spooner continues his cruel manipulation,

again with explicit reference to speech:

"A metaphor.

Things are looking

up," and later, "you lack the essential quality of manliness, which is to put
your money where your mouth is" (NML, pp. 94-95).
pitch:

"Let me perhaps be your boatman [ ....

J

Then he makes his sales

In other words, never disdain a

helping hand, especially one of such rare quality" (NML, p. 95).32

Hirst

-17replies by making the titular speech and crawling out of the room (NML, p.
96) .

When Hirst reappears, he pretends not to know Spooner and gains conrol of
the conversation with his speeches about the dream of the drowning person and
the past, which is symbolized by his photo album (NML, pp. 106-109).

His

dream narrative resembles Deborah's account of her experiences:
It was blinding. I remember it. I've forgotten. By all
that's sacred and holy. The sounds stopped. It was
freezing. There's a gap in me. I can't fill it [ .... J
They're blotting me out. Who is doing it? I'm suffocating
[ .... J Someone is doing me to death. (NML, p. 108)
Like Deborah's "chains and padlocks" speech, this speech combines the
colloquial, ambiguous "they" with poetic elements, suggesting an ambiguous,
anonymous, danger.

The shift from past to present (which is typical of this

play) indicate Hirst's timeless condition of despair and drinking.

His

permanent restriction to verbal action contributes to his bad memory and
failure to notice his surroundings:

"I am sitting here forever [ .... J I wish

you'd damnwell tell me what night it is [ .... J There's too much solitary
shi ttery" (NML, p. 108).
Hirst's disposition is completely different the next day.

As if he had

searched through his photo album to remember Spooner's name, he greets him as
Charles, an old friend (NML, p. 126).
friendly manner as he recalls the war:
didn't you?" (NML, pp. 127-129).

He adopts an aggressive and mock"You did say you had a good war,

After the two men accuse each other of

various sexual aberrations, Spooner angers Hirst by referring to one of his
own poems:

"It is written in terza rima, a form which, if you will forgive my

saying so, you have never been able to master" (NML, p. 135).
response is to order a drink and express angry disbelief:
You are clearly a lout.

The Charles Wetherby I knew was

Hirst's

-18a gentleman. I see a figure reduced [ .... J I do not
understand ... and I see it all about me ... continually ...
how the most sensitive and cultivated of men can so easily
change, almost overnight, into the bully, the cutpurse, the
brigand. In illY day nobody changed. (NML, p. 136,
emphasis mine)
But if Spooner is protean, so is Hirst, at least with respect to his
moods and memories.

The permanence he refers to here is unlike his own, which

is the bleak "no man's land"; in fact, all indications are that he is one of
these fallen cultivated men; he has left a successful past and become a
failure and a drunk.

He tells Spooner to "tender the dead" partly because he

is almost dead himself, like the forgotten tennis balls he describes later:
"They are lost there, given up for dead, centuries old" (NML, p. 139).
Spooner poses a threat to the job security of Foster and Briggs, Hirst's
two henchmen.

In contrast to the educated speech of Spooner and Hirst, their

dialect suggests that they are lower-class, and in the Peter Hall production
they were played with Cockney accents. 33

When they first enter, Foster tries

to alienate Spooner by pretending his name is Friend and by repeatedly asking
him what he's drinking (NML, pp. 97-100).
is less forceful but cruder:
Head.

Briggs, who is older than Foster,

"Whereas he's a pintpot attendant in The Bull's

And a pisspot attendant too .... I've seen Irishmen chop his balls off"

(NML, pp. 110-111).

Despite Hirst's financial and intellectual superiority

over Briggs and Foster, they wield considerable control over him:
Foster: Listen chummybum. We protect this gentleman against
corruption, against men of craft, against men of evil,
we could destroy you without a glance, we take care of
this gentleman, we do it out of love. (NML, p. 111)
It is possible that Spooner fails to control Hirst because he doesn't use the
cruel, crude speech tactics of Foster and Briggs; ultimately, verbal
sophistication loses to the language of violent action and domination; Foster,
who says, "I don't usually talk.

I don't have to," says of Spooner, "Why

-19don't I kick his head off and have done with it?" (pp. 111-112).
Briggs' feelings toward Foster are strong and mixed.
him:

"Neurotic poof.

He prefers idleness.

nothing but a vagabond cock" (NML, p. 114).

In Act I he says of

Unspeakable ponce [ .... J He's
But the Bo1sover Street speech

expresses affection and insecurity toward Foster:
We're old friends, Jack and myself. We met at a street
corner. I should tell you he'll deny this account [ .... J
A car drew up. It was him. He asked me the way to Bo1sover
street. I told him Bolvover street was in the middle of an
intricate one-way system [ .... J All he's got to do is to
reverse into the underground car park, change gear, go
straight on, and he'll find himself in Bolsover street with
no trouble at all [ .... J I told him I knew one or two people
who'd been wandering up and down Bolsover street for years.
They'd wasted their bloody youth there [ .... J I remember
saying to him: This trip you've got in mind, drop it, it
could prove fatal [ .... J I took all this trouble with him
because he had a nice open face.
(NML, p. 120)
This speech epitomizes Pinter's refusal to treat exposition as a mere vehicle
for undisputed background facts.

The breathtaking leaps of content, tense,

and personal opinion here illustrate the way in which Pinter combines
naturalistic and stylized elements to yield a speech that implicitly
characterizes the speaker.
The speech takes three turns:

first, from an account of how he met

Foster to a lengthy set of directions to a London street (accompanied by a
shift to present tense); second, from the directions to social commentary; and
third, from this general comment to his motivations for helping Foster.

Thus,

the naturalistic detail of the street directions veils a self-defining
justification for his fondness for Foster.

The speech acts here are

assertions, but Briggs' warning that Foster will deny them suspends the
illocutionary effect in the audience and creates a feeling of doubt that calls
for careful and critical listening.

Briggs' defensiveness suggests that he

-20could be lying, which in turn suggests that he is insecure and ambivalent
about his with Foster.
All the main elements of the play--drinking, Spooner's pleas, Hirst's
reveries, and the henchmen's complaints--intensify and recur as the play draws
to a close.

Like Spooner's repeated use of the statement "I have known this

before" (a possible echo of Eliot's Prufrock), this repetition adds to the
feeling that the action is a self-repeating, self-sustaining cycle (NML, p.
96).34

To Spooner's final plea, which is his longest and spoken in the

language of chivalry, Hirst replies:
Let us change the subject.
Pause
For the last time.
Pause
What have I said?
Foster: You said you're changing the subject for the last
time.
Hirst:

But what does that mean? [ .... J

Foster: So that nothing else will happen forever [ .... J We'll be
with you. Briggs and me. (NML, pp. 149-152)
Hirst concludes that he didn't see anyone drowning in the water, Spooner
echoes his earlier speech by telling him he's in "no man's land," and Hirst
answers with the closing line, "I'll drink to that" (NML, p. 153).
In a sense, nothing has happened here besides drinking, rej ection, breakdmvn
of communication, and articulate expression of despair.
quite far:

Gale takes this point

" ... some of the dialogue seems merely to be witty conversation,"

and "These are men who no longer act--they talk.,,35
of action, a great deal more has taken place.

But if speech is a form

Spooner has gained and lost the

confidence of Hirst; Hirst has "come to a conclusion" about "certain matters"
(namely, to adhere to his current condition forever); Foster and Briggs have
included themselves in Hirst's hell while excluding Spooner.

Still, the fact

-21that the characters often talk past each other makes this action seem idle; as
John Bush Jones says, there are few predictable causal relationships among
these actions. 36

The reliance on trite oracular and literary skills as forms

of action perpetuates Hirst's eternal despair and reveals Spooner's
vulnerability.

Before making general inferences about drama and speech act theory, I
will consider three main types of objection to Searle's theory in light of my
analysis.

I will refer to them and discuss them in order as follows:

the

Derridean objection, the philosophy of language objection, and the literary
criticism objection.

I will consider these objections in order and follow

with a discussion of whether Searle's theory can accommodate them.
In "Signature Event Context,,37 and the hilariously long-winded "Limited
Inc abc ... ",38 Jaques Derrida levels several criticisms against speech act
theory.

The former essay addresses Austin's account, and the latter is a

reply to Searle's objections to this essay in "A Reply to Derrida.,,39

Because

of the radically different approaches of Derrida and Searle, this debate is
extremely polemical, and they often write at cross-purposes.
this at the end of "Signature";
neutralization:

(Derrida admits

"Deconstruction cannot limit itself ... to a

it must ... practice an overturning of the classical opposition

and a general displacement of the system.,,40)
The primary objection is that Austin ignores what Derrida is always at
pains to point out, namely, the "arbitrariness of the sign":
Austin has not taken into account that which is in the
structure of locution (and therefore before any illocutory
or perlocutory determination) already bears within itself
the syst~m of predicates that I call graphematic in
general. I

-22Derrida asks,
Could a performative statement succeed if its formulation
did not repeat a 'coded' or iterable statement, in other
words if the expressions I use to open a meeting, launch
a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming
to an iterable model, and therefore if they were not
identifiable in a way as 'citation,?42
He proposes a "new typology" in the study of utterances in which "different
types of marks or chains of iterable marks" would replace intention as the
center of attention. 43

That is, Derrida believes that the study of languge as

a sign system takes logical priority over the study of language as speech
acts.

His emphasis on the uncertain meaning and interdependence of linguistic

elements leads him to conclude that Austin's failure to acknowledge this flaws
his case.
Derrida's point is worth noting, but the assertion that the indeterminacy
of signs logically precedes intended speech acts is like arguing that the
chicken came before the egg; the relationship between speakers and language
is dynamic, and neither intention nor signs should occupy center stage.

As

Searle says in "Reply" (which, as Derrida is at pains to indicate in "Limited
Inc," is quite hotheaded),
Iterability ... is not as Derrida seems to think something
in conflict with the intentionality of linguistic acts ...
it is the necessary presuPRosition of the forms which
that intentionality takes. 4
Derrida's objection, then, is not so much a threat to speech act theory as a
plea for a competing interest in the study of language.

Still, Pinter's

dialogue often conveys the feeling that there is something inherently
restrictive and inadequate about language, such that it sometimes leads a
speaker into almost involuntary patterns of speech.

For example, a

deconstructionist might say that the conformity of Spooner's chivalric
language "to an iterable model" and its status as a "citation" against its

-23historical background combines with the fact what he says is false and
affected and so reveals his pathetic state (despite his persuasive intention):
I am 1. I offer myself not abj ectly but with ancient pride.
come to you as a warrior. I shall be happy to serve
you as my master. I bend my knee to your excellence.
I am furnished with the qualities of piety, prudence,
liberality and goodness. Decline them at your peril.
I

(NML, p. 147)

On Searle's account, this effect could be handled with an account of the
illocutionary force and intended perlocutionary force of this language in this
context.

The first six sentences assert Spooner's qualities and presuppose

Hirst's superiority, yielding the effect of obsequiousness, given the action
and characterization that precede this speech.

The last sentence is in the

imperative and has the force of a (presumably idle) threat.

The analysis of

this speech as either a speech act or a Derridean linguistic citation, then,
yields similar results.

As Derrida suggests, the objection that Austin

ignores some linguistic elements in his analysis doesn't refute speech act
theory but rather points out an omission in the analysis.
I

now turn to the philosophy of language objection to Searle's theory.

I

will consider two versions of this type of objection, first from Dennis
Stampers "Meaning and Truth in the Theory of Speech Acts,,45 and second from
David Holdcroft's Words and Deeds. 46

My purpose in considering this objection

is primarily to test Searle's study of speech acts on its own terms, not to
demonstrate its applicability to literary criticism.
Dennis Stampe's quarrel with Searle centers on two of Searle's concepts,
the ifid (illocutionary-force-indicating device, phrases like "I hereby
promise") and the PE (Principle of Expressibility, i.e., "whatever can be
meant can be said") (SA, p. 19).
ifid

Stampe first claims that Searle elevates the

-24to the status of a theoretical entity, so that those factors
thought to determine illocutionary force where the
performative prefix occurs may be held to operate to
determine force even where no prefix or other ifid
occurs--i.e., where the ifid is not 'overt. ,47
Stampe's objection locates a central ambivalence in Searle's analysis.

On the

one hand, Searle wants to use the ifid as an implicit model of what is "MEANT
by what one says in uttering a sentence that is inexplicit as to force. ,.48

On

the other hand, Searle deliberately avoids this identification of meaning and
force in his "speech act fallacy," an error that takes the form, "The word H
is used to perform speech act

~.,

(SA, pp. 136-141).

Moreover, Searle indicates at one point that a statement without a
certain ifid may (in a given context) have the same illocutionary force as a
statement without it. 49

On this context-centered interpretation of Searle,

the ifid can be viewed as a model that makes the point that utterances often
contain linguistic clues about their illocutionary force.

Stampe's claim that

Searle equates force and meaning points, therefore, to a fundamental tension
in Searle, but one which I think can be resolved without threatening his
central concepts of convention and rules (see SA, pp. 20, 21, 61). 50
Stampe and Holdcroft share two general views in common: that Searle's PE
is untenable, and that Searle is wrong in abolishing Austin's locutionary/
illocutionary distinction. 51

Since Holdcroft articulates these objections

more completely than Stampe, I will state his case.

Holdcroft initiates his

argument by objecting to Searle's abolition of the locutionary/illocutionary
distinction:

"because, in his view, every sentence contains some indicator of

i11ocutionary force, every such description is a description of an
illocutionaryact . .,52

This is not quite true, because on Searle's account,

context can serve the rule-govened function of determining il10cutionary force

-25(SA, p. 36).

Spooner illustrates the importance of context when he recalls

the impression the Hungarian made on him:
What he said ... all those years ago ... is neither here nor there.
It was not what he said but possible the way he sat which has
remained with me all my life and has, I am quite sure, made me
what I am.
(NML, p. 87)
Before presenting Holdcroft's argument against Searle's Principle of
Expressibility, let me begin by stating it:
speaker

~

whenever

& such

expression
p. 20).

~

"for any meaning

K and

any

means ... K then it is possible that there is some

that

& is

an exact expression of or formulation of K" (SA,

As Searle says, though, the "expressibility" in PE does not refer to

such things as complicated effects in listeners or obscure, private languages
(SA, p. 20).

Searle infers that PE "enables us to equate rules for performing

speech acts with rules for uttering certain linguistic elements" (SA, p. 20).
I agree with Holdcroft that this is false. 53

For, to hold this would be to

commit the speech act fallacy that Searle claims to avoid (SA, p. 137).
Further, it ignores the critical element of context that Searle himself
articulates in the following rule:

"K counts

§J2

1: in context .Q" (SA, p. 36).

It does not follow from this, however, that PE is false or untenable.
There is a deep ambivalence, then, in Searle's attitude toward the
connection between certain expressions and the speech acts they might be used
to perform.

Although he stresses context and wants to avoid the speech act

fallacy, he is attracted to the notion of connecting certain words to certain
actions.

I think, however, that Searle's basic analysis is sound and that

this ambivalence can be resolved by emphasizing context and deleting what
appear to be commissions of the speech act fallacy from his theory.
This brings me to the third type of objection, namely, the literary
criticism objection.

I will discuss three forms of literary objection to

-26Searle's speech act theory.

In "The Problem of Inferred Modality in

Narrative," Horst Ruthrof objects to Searle on three related grounds: first,
and wrongly, that Searle assumes there is "perfect meaning exchange," in
indirect speech acts, and second, that he "leaves out such important issues as
the spatial position of the speaker and is vague about inferrable values and
ideological commitment," and third, that "his starting point and method
(propositional content modified by illocutionary features) deny him the full
exploration of what goes on when we make meaning."S4

I think this third

objection is also false; Searle's "starting point and method" isn't
"propositional content modified by illocutionary force," nor is it clear that
his program logically prevents a fuller study of context.

The first and

second points constitute only an incompleteness objection, calling for a more
complete account of what Searle calls context.
Altieri echoes this objection by claiming that Searle's theory is
inherently unable to handle "social practices" and "actual conversations."S5
Searle, according to Altieri, "tries to domesticate Austin within the confines
of analytic philosophy."S6

This philosophy, he says, exhibits an

"insensitivity to the expressive features of the speech acts he purports to
analyze."S7

Like Ruthrof, however, Altieri fails to show that such a

sensitivity to speech acts would be inconsistent with Searle's view.

Still,

Searle's theory (as it stands) seems to have little to say about Spooner's
bizarre jeer at Hirst:
Remember this. You've lost your wife of hazel hue, you've
lost her and what can you do, she will no more come back to
you, with a tillifola tillifola tillifoladi-foladi-foloo.
(NML, p. 96)
Claiming (wrongly) that Searle ignores context and style (and conventions like
irony), Altieri rejects Searle's account as being useless for literary

-27criticism and takes up Paul Grice's account instead. 58

As I said, I think

this ambivalence about context is resolvable within Searle's account, and I
will show that Grice's analysis is not fundamentally incompatible with
Searle's.
In "How to Do Things With Austin and Searle," Stanley Fish writes a
speech act analysis of Shakespeare's Coriolanus and concludes that speech act
theory
cannot possibly serve as an all purpose interpretive
key .... it can't tell us anything about what happens after an
illocutionary act has been performed (it is not a rhetoric);
it can't tell us anything about the inner life of the
performer 59 ... it can't serve as the basis of a stylistics;
it can't be elaborated into a poetics of narrative; it can't
help us to tell the difference between literature and nonliterature; it can't distinguish between serious discourse
and a work of fiction, and ~t cannot, without cheating,
separate fiction from fact. 0
This passage summarizes the literary objections I have outlined so far.

Fish

also objects to giving fiction the ontological status of parasitism, claiming
that 'the distinction between fiction and serious discourse is not one of
logical dependence but merely "one between two systems of discourse
conventions. ,,61

That is, "words are responsible not to what is real but to

what has been laid down as real ... by a set of constitutive rules.,,62

I think

this objection is serious, and I suggest a solution to it below.
With the exception of this parasitism objection, Fish's is also an
incompleteness objection.

His point seems to be that, since Austin and Searle

don't settle these questions, these issues lie outside their theoretical
jurisdiction.

But in fact, several writers have successfully applied this

contextual element of speech act theory to literary works.

Mary Louise Pratt,

for example, shows how speech act theory provides a way of talking about
utterances

-28not only in terms of their surface grammatical properties
but also in terms of the context in which they are made,
the ~n~entiong3 attitudes, and expectations of the
partLcLpants.
And, contrary to Fish, Pratt also believes that speech act theory IIdoes away
with the distortive and misleading concepts of 'poetic' and 'ordinary'
language.,,64

This type of move makes the theory's applicability to

literature, especially Pinter plays, clear.

I will summarize and respond to

the three objections and then place my discussion of Pinter in the perspective
of this analysis.
The Derridean objection deals with the apparent inability of speech act
theory to address the inherent indeterminacy of language.

As I said, Derrida

doesn't claim to fully discredit speech act theory; rather, he merely points
to Austin's failure to take certain linguistic factors into account.

Beyond

this, it is important to recognize that Derrida's philosophical program
differs in kind from Searle's in its emphasis on scepticism and that on its
terms speech act theory (along with all other theoretical positions) is
problematic.

As Pinter's dialogue shows, moreover,' it doesn't follow from

failures of language to communicate that speaking is not an intentional, rulegoverned activity.
The philosophy of language objection demonstrates the ambivalence in
Searle between avoiding context and blending meaning and illocutionary force;
it also points out some of the shortcomings of the latter view.

My view

(although I won't prove it here) is that Searle's theory can survive a descent
from this fence-sitting position firmly on the side of context.

The literary

criticism objection, as I said, picks up on this ambivalence and often wrongly
interprets it as a logical shortcoming.

Finally, the literary perspective

rightly objects to Searle's view that literature is logically parasitic on

-29ordinary language.
This view of literature as being parasitic paralells that of the critics
who view Pinter's language as a variation on a supposedly normal type of
language.

This problematic notion can be overcome by adopting Ludwig

Wittgenstein's concept of "language-game" "to bring into prominence the fact
that the speaking; of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.,,65
Wittgenstein views language as consisting of related uses of language whose
"multiplicity is not something fixed, given once and for all. 1166

Further,

these varied uses are interconnected in "a complicated network of similarities
overlapping and criss-crossing" he calls "family resemblances. ,,67

Such a view

(as Quigley points out) can bypass the logical necessity of counter-intuitive
notions like the parasitic status of literature.
This non-hierarchical type of view, which is compatible with
speech act theory, views literary forms as simply different (not logically
dependent) types of language use.

As Pinter's successful blend of naturalistic

and stylized language shows, this model seems more accurate than one that
privileges an unspecified, normal language use over others.

Almansi and

Henderson, following this Wittgensteinian approach, write, "Pinter's games of
mimicry and agon are both, primarily, games involving language. ,,68
Applying this concept to fictional literature in general, we can replace
the idea of logical parasitism with Pratt's understanding of "literariness or
poeticality" as "a particular disposition of speaker and audience with regard
to the message, one that is characteristic of the literary speech
situation. ,,69
In "Logic and Conversation," Paul Grice incorporates context into speech
act theory by building its analysis up from the foundation of conversation;70

-30this is accomplished by the "Cooperative Principle":

"Make your

conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk-exchange in which you
are engaged.,,7l

This approach differs from Searle's in that it avoids

identifying linguistic rules with speech act rules, an equation that I think
is mistaken (SA, p. 20).

Still, with the exception of this view,

Grice's

approach does not run counter to his own (as Searle himself shows in "Indirect
Speech Acts" 72 ).

Thus, though less systematic, Grice's view is more

accommodating to non-literal language uses and points the way to a revision
and expansion of Searle's theory.

As I see it, these two views are actually

complementary, though different in focus.
Since, as I hope I have shown, Searle's view is not essentially
incompatible with those of Wittgenstein and Grice, it can therefore meet and
overcome the force of the three objections I have raised.

Searle's main

hypothesis, that language use is governed by rules, is plausible, theoretically
elegant, and also serves to shed light on literary works such as plays (SA, p.
12).

With the amendments I have proposed, I think Searle's theory offers a

sound foundation for a theory of language.

I leave this project of revision

in sketch form and return to the plays and the question of the value of this
analysis.
The main challenge to a speech act approach to literature is simply how
to apply the theory to specific texts.

Making the connection between

conversation and narrative (with the help of Grice), Pratt says,
Natural Narratives formally acknowledge that in voluntarily
committing ourselves to play the role of audience, we are
accepting an exceptional or unusual imposition. This claim,
I believe, holds for voluntary audience roles in general and
is crucial to our understanding of the appropriateness
conditions bearing on many kinds of speech situations,
including literary ones. 73

-31The Bolsover street speech comes to mind.

In that case, Spooner is the

primary audience, and the theater audience is secondary.

I think Pratt's

choice of the word "audience" is no accident here, nor do I think it is an
accident that Fish, Joseph Porter, and Shoshona Felman have all done speech
act readings of plays. 74

Fish interestingly says that Coriolanus is "about

speech acts," an observation that he uses to deny the general applicability of
the theory to literature. 75

Porter's assertion is more general:

A drama is a sequence of acts, verbal and nonverbal, done
by a group of characters to or on each other .... The
'speeches,' the bulk of the text, consist of the words
in which the verbal action is done.,,76
Felman's book compares the significance of promising in the Don Juan story
(primarily in Moliere) to its significance in Austin's theory.77
Altieri's view of a "dramatistic approach to speech acts" bears more than
a metaphorical resemblance to Pratt's view and stresses the element of
context.

He says, "when we learn a language in a culture we develop powers to

understand semantic properties in relation to several kinds of dramatistic
contexts. 1178
The study of Pinter is especially relevant to these types of contextual
elements in language use.

In Dialogue and Discourse, Dierdre Burton asks

(about a typically elusive Pinter dialogue): "how do we know so much about the
interactants in the dialogue?,,79

Her purpose in doing a sociolinguistic

analysis of Pinter's sketch "Last to Go,,80 is "to specify how a given dialogue
is like a naturally occurring conversation. ,,81

She is not so much concerned

with the literary qualities of the work as the fact that, as Eric Salmon puts
it, "almost all of Pinter's early characters speak the most accurate Cockney
that has ever been written for the English stage.,,82
All of this leads me to the following point:

if speech act literary

-32criticism can offer a coherent approach to literary works, then drama is the
most appropriate genre to which it can be applied.

Just as New Criticism has

poetry as its standard of interpretation and structuralist (and poststructuralist) criticism typically analyzes narrative fiction, so I think
drama is most

.

su~te

d to speec h
.
83
act·~nterpretat~on.

Because conversational dialogue is the primary form of utterance in
drama, speech act theory offers a particularly valuable perspective to its
interpretation.

I think valuable dramatic criticism could be done with the

slightly revised and expanded version of speech act theory that I sketched
here.

And unlike some forms of traditional criticism, this speech act theory

would have the advantage of a basis in a rigorous philosophy of language.
Searle (who sees works of fiction as pretended speech acts) says this
about drama:
the playwright's performance in writing the text of the play
is rather like writing a recipe for pretense than engaging
in a form of pretense itself .... the illocutionary force of
the.tex~f a play is like the illocutionary force of a
rec~pe.

Although Searle probably commits the mimetic fallacy here (the idea that art
should and does imitate reality), this passage is quite interesting.

For, if the

playwright's role resembles that of the recipe writer, then one of his
challenges must be to anticipate a variety of performances (cooks and
kitchens) and to avoid parochialism (little-known measuring units or
unavailable ingredients).
Pinter's concentration on the rich ambiguity and open-endedness of
ordinary conversation satisfies these conditions to a point where the audience
often engages in an act of creative interpretation that resembles the
playwright's.

But, as he has said, the rule "anything goes" never applies to

-33a Pinter play:
I don't think that they [the plays] bear a very great amount
of shifting and changing and different interpretations ....
I think what has to be done is just to play the damn
lines and stop, start, move and do it all very clearly
and economically.8~G

& Kind
acts.

of Alaska and No Man's Land are, in different ways, about speech

The first centers on the difficulty of satisfying the conditions of an

illocutionary speech act, and the second spotlights language as a deceitful
tool of power and an unsatisfactory substitute for friendship.

When Hirst

responds to Spooner's offer of friendship with "No man's land ... does not
move ... or change ... or grow old ... remains ... forever ... icy ... silent, "
he chooses language (perhaps quoting from one of his own poems) over
friendship (NML, p. 96).

Because of Pinter's keen interest in communicative

subtlety, it is easy to imagine speech act analyses of any of his plays.
Rather than demonstrating a logical hierarchy of different language uses,
Pinter's dialogue shows the opposite, namely, the interdependence ("family
resemblances") between different types of language use.

The blend of

ordinary, British conversation with literary language, the lack of predictable
causation from speech act to speech act, the persistent attention to the
fragile complexity of speech acts, and the choice of extraordinary dramatic
situations (both naturalistic and stylized) all figure in the "hyperrealistic"
effects of Pinter's drama.
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